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Abstract 
The authors develop an expected utility model with heterogeneous individuals and 
apply some of the approaches developed in the energy literature to explicitly identify the 
public nature characteristics of susceptibility in a dynamic setting and to characterize the 
optimal intertemporal usage problem from a social planner perspective. The authors 
determine the optimal time path for the depletion of susceptibility to an existing drug and 
show that use of antibiotics should be rationed across the population and through time. 
The authors also discuss the impact of endogenous technological change and analyze the 
dynamics of research activities in backstop technologies both in a certain and in an 
uncertain world. The authors show that resources invested in R&D should increase 
through time if the discovery process is uncertain.
   
 
 
OPTIMAL ANTIBIOTIC USAGE WITH RESISTANCE 
AND ENDOGENOUS TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
 
Introduction 
A recent review article in the New England Journal of Medicine stated that “the 
prevalence of antimicrobial-resistant human pathogens is rapidly increasing, but the 
discovery and development of new antimicrobial drugs that are active against multidrug-
resistant organisms have slowed dramatically” (Gold and Moellering, p. 1446). As Table 
1 shows, most of the antibiotic families known today were discovered in the 1940s, 
during the “ antibiotic revolution” (Kingston).  
More recently, discoveries have substantially slowed down: only one class, the 
quinolones, was discovered in the 1960s. A new class, the oxazolidinones, is presently 
undergoing clinical trials (Diekema and Jones).  
The problem of resistance is not limited to bacteria; it also affects the treatment of 
viruses such as the ones responsible for AIDS (Fauci), and disease carriers, such as the 
Anopheles mosquito, which is a host for the malaria parasite. According to the World 
Health Organization and the World Bank, resistance is one of the main reasons why it has 
not been possible to eradicate malaria (World Health Organization/World Bank).1   
The usage of these drugs2 poses an impure public goods problem. Utilization jointly 
generates a (positive) private characteristic, which depends exclusively on the 
individual’s consumption of the chemical, and a (negative) public characteristic, that is, 
the reduction in susceptibility. The magnitude of the reduction depends on the sum of all 
the individuals’ use, both in the present and in the past, as in the case of an accumulating 
form of pollution. Susceptibility has a common-property nature because individual usage 
has a minimal impact on it; therefore, individuals tend to ignore the effect that their 
actions have on resistance. Susceptibility is a scarce resource, and although resistance  
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Table 1.  Main antibiotic families and some of their characteristics 
Family Type Usage 
Date of First 
Discovery 
Date of First 
Use 
Aminoglycosides Natural Antitubercolosis 
agents 
1944 1946 
Cephalosporins Natural Broad spectrum 1945 1964 
Chloranphenicol Natural, 
synthetic 
Broad spectrum 1947 1949 
Macrolides Natural Pharyngitis, 
pneumonia 
1952 1950s 
Oxazolidinones Synthetic Broad spectrum 1987 Undergoing 
human trials 
Penicillins Natural, 
semi-synthetic 
Broad spectrum 1929 1942 
Quinolones Synthetic Broad spectrum 1962 1960s 
Sulfonamides Synthetic Broad spectrum 1932 1935 
Tetracyclines Natural Broad spectrum 1947 1966 
Sources: Levy (1992); Encyclopedia Britannica Online (2000a, 2000b); Diekema and Jones; Kingston. 
 
 
management plans that slow down resistance development are feasible, they can only 
reduce the impact of antibiotic usage on resistance development and not eliminate it. 
In a first-best world, resistance buildup should affect optimal usage; benefits of 
antibiotic use in terms of improved health must be weighed against the costs of lower 
susceptibility in the future. Society also faces the decision of how many resources to 
invest in the discovery of new agents effective against the pest/microbe. Therefore, there 
is the need to examine the issues of resource allocation and availability of substitutes.  
The objective of this paper is to explicitly identify the public nature characteristics of 
susceptibility in a dynamic setting and to characterize the optimal intertemporal usage 
problem from a social planner perspective. This allows us to discuss two essential social 
welfare issues. The first is the optimal number of people to treat while susceptibility to an 
existing drug lasts, that is, the trade-off between present and future use of a drug. The 
second issue is how many resources to allocate to the development of new drugs. The 
allocation of effort for the development of alternative technologies is an important social 
welfare issue, particularly in the case of pharmaceutical products because we are dealing 
with human health. The decision of how many resources to devote to research efforts 
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aimed at discovering new chemical compounds will depend on these activities’ relative 
costs and benefits. These costs and benefits will in turn be a function of both stock and 
flow variables, such as the production costs of the chemicals, the level of susceptibility of 
the existing resource, and the overall amount of effort already spent on research.  
Similarly, the determination of the optimal number of people to whom treatment 
should be administered is a significant issue, particularly because there is abundant 
anecdotal evidence of excessive and unnecessary usage of antimicrobials. According to 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, for instance, around a third of the 150 
million outpatient antibiotics prescribed each year are unneeded (Levy, 1998). Table 2 
shows how some countries’ antibiotic usage is much higher than others and includes a 
higher amount of broad spectrum antibiotics, for which the development of resistance is a 
greater concern. In Australia in particular, the situation has spurred various government 
inquiries (Doessel).3 
Research on substitute technologies can be subdivided into two types:  research on 
compounds similar to those already known, and basic research on new alternative 
technologies. The objective of the first type of activity is to discover antibiotics (or 
pesticides) that use a similar mode of action to those already known. This type of research 
is likely to involve a lower degree of uncertainty, since the existing drug provides a 
blueprint for scientists. Examples are the development of the semi-synthetic methicillin 
from penicillin, and the discovery of various pesticides all belonging to the same family, 
such as the chlorinated hydrocarbons, which include DDT, dieldrin, and endrin. 
 
Table 2.  Non-public sector antibiotic sales in 1983 
Country Defined Daily Dosea /1,000 Population/Day Broad/Narrow Ratio 
Sweden 7.01 1.72 
UK 9.36 4.03 
Canada 11.64 2.74 
USA 13.22 2.07 
Australia 17.12 4.69 
Source: Doessel, 1998. 
Note: Non-public sector sales exclude in-hospital use.  
a The Defined Daily Dose is an aggregate measure of usage that allows comparisons. 
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In most of these cases, there is likely to be cross-resistance between the old and new 
compounds. Cross-resistance occurs when the development of resistance to a compound 
also confers at least partial resistance to another chemical, so that the second chemical is 
less effective than it would have been if it had been used first. The likelihood of cross-
resistance depends on the fact that the chemicals have a similar mode of action or a 
resembling structure (Levy, 1992). 
In the case of antibiotics, cross-resistance causes multidrug resistance to occur. This 
is a particularly dangerous phenomenon, because it can become impossible to treat an 
illness. The present emergence of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis worldwide is a case in 
point (Cohn, Bustreo, and Raviglione). Cross-resistance is particularly worrisome in 
antibiotics because resistance is transmitted from one strain of bacteria to another,4 so 
that multidrug resistance in bacteria is the rule rather than the exception (Levy, 1992). 
Resistance has developed to all known antimicrobial drugs (Gold and Moellering) while, 
as we noted, the discovery of new classes of antibiotics has slowed down since the 1950s, 
making this a particularly important policy problem. According to the American Society 
for Microbiology (ASM), we are in an “incipient public health emergency, albeit one that 
is poorly appreciated and recognized” (ASM, p. 4).5  
Resources can also be invested in the discovery of novel technologies, for which 
cross-resistance is not likely to be an issue. For example, vaccines are a cost-effective 
alternative to antibiotics. Other possible alternatives include both biospecific antibodies, 
which support the body’s immune system in eliminating microbes, and bacteria-attacking 
viruses (Nemecek).6 
In broad terms, the discovery of novel active ingredients and treatments is likely to 
involve a higher degree of pure research than the discovery of new antibiotics or 
pesticides that use a similar mode of action to those already known. Nowadays most 
pharmaceutical and chemical companies maintain substantial in-house research 
facilities,7 and the traditional dichotomy of public sector/pure research and private 
sector/applied research is not clear-cut. However, the discovery of totally new 
compounds is likely to involve a high level of basic research, and this might have 
implications for both private and public research priorities and activities. 
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Both in the case of pests and of microorganisms, susceptibility could be modeled 
either as a nonrenewable or as a renewable resource. The choice impinges on  the relative 
fitness of the resistant individuals compared to the susceptible ones. Should there be a 
fitness cost for the resistant organisms, it would tend to disappear once the usage of the 
chemical selecting for them had been stopped. There appears to be evidence that resistant 
bacteria do not suffer from any fitness cost (Stewart et al.).8  
Limited literature exists on the common-property nature of susceptibility in the case 
of antibiotics. Tisdell provides a basic analysis, even though he frames the issue in terms 
of a prisoner’s dilemma and not as a problem of the commons. Brown and Layton 
analyze the externalities involved in the use of antibiotics as growth promoters for 
animals, with a focus on the trade-offs. Both farmers and sick individuals choose the 
optimal level of medication, taking resistance as given, thereby overutilizing the 
antibiotic. Laxminarayan and Brown examine how to optimally utilize two antibiotics 
with different impacts on resistance without incorporating the development of backstop 
technologies, in a problem similar to that of the mining of various deposits of ore of 
different quality. Kile models the R&D expenditure in the private sector as a function of 
resistance. He finds some evidence that increases in the levels of resistance have a 
positive impact on the level of R&D expenditure, the rationale being that higher levels of 
resistance shorten the life span of existing drugs, so that their producers need to find 
alternative products.  
Even though the economics literature has not focused on antibiotics use in optimal 
planning models, there is a large body of work on issues of common property and 
externalities in relation to exhaustible resources. Kamien and Schwartz (1982) provide an 
excellent literature review.   
An extensive amount of economics literature, spurred by the energy crisis of the 
early 1970s, has analyzed the issues related to the use of a nonrenewable resource when 
the discovery of backstops is uncertain. Dasgupta and Heal’s seminal paper (1974) 
analyzes the problem when there is uncertainty as to the date of discovery of the new, 
nonrenewable technology (and not on its characteristics). The probability of the discovery 
date is exogenous, and there are no investment efforts. They prove that in certain 
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circumstances the uncertainty is formally equivalent to an increase in the discount rate. 
Kamien and Schwartz (1978) and Dasgupta, Heal, and Majumdar extend the model to 
endogenize the level of investment that accelerates the time of discovery of the new 
technology.  Davison uses essentially the same framework for the case in which the 
probability of discovering a backstop is a function of the flow of R&D and not its stock. 
Next we develop an expected utility model with heterogeneous individuals and apply 
some of the approaches outlined in the energy literature to determine the optimal time 
path for the depletion of susceptibility to an existing drug. We assume that technological 
change is endogenous and analyze the dynamics of research in backstop technologies 
both in a certain and in an uncertain world.  
 
The Basic Framework 
When prescribing an antibiotic for an individual, the doctor or the manufacturer 
exogenously gives the dose. Therefore, we treat the choice of an individual drug as a 
discrete choice problem. Individuals are heterogeneous in their need for treatment, which 
allows analysis of the marginal impact of each treatment, the optimal number of individuals 
treated, and the externalities created by the increase in resistance induced by usage.  
We will use the expected utility framework (Evans and Viscusi) to examine the issue 
of optimal use of antibiotics. We will also show how the model can be easily used for the 
case of pesticides. Preferences are quasilinear. Utility derived from the consumption of 
good x is contingent on good health, while utility obtained from the numéraire good y is 
independent of health. Therefore, each agent’s utility is of the form: ( )i ix ya + , where 
' 0, '' 0a a> < , and 
0
lim ( )
x
x
d
a
®
= ¥ . Think of good x as any good that requires good health 
to provide positive utility; in bad health, the utility derived from x is zero (Fuchs and 
Zeckhauser).  
The economy is either based on endowments or is such that the supply of labor is 
fixed over time: each individual i is given an identical endowment/wage m at each time t. 
In each time period each individual also faces a lump sum tax t  to finance activities that 
prevent the buildup of resistance and the research in backstop technologies. We limit 
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ourselves to the case in which t  is identical for everybody. This is consistent with the 
public nature of susceptibility and with the fact that the level of infection is independent 
of agents’ actions. Alternatively, we could think that taxes are set ex ante, before people 
get sick, and, ex ante, individuals are identical in every respect.  
Individuals maximize instantaneous utility. As discussed in more detail below, 
individuals cannot use their past sickness as a predictor for the future, and the 
development of resistance has a public good nature; thus each individual takes the 
existing stock of susceptibility E as given and his or her contribution to resistance 
development as negligible. There is no ‘golden glow’ effect on the part of untreated 
individuals with respect to the health levels of others in the economy, and susceptibility 
has no option value. We define treatment for individual i as 1ie =  and the no treatment 
case as 0ie = , with p as the price of the antibiotic. We assume that the marginal cost of 
production, ?, is constant, and the pharmaceutical industry is perfectly competitive9, so 
that p = ?.10 
The budget constraint for each agent is then i i ix y pe mt+ + + = . We can then rewrite 
the utility function as ( )i i ix m x pea t+ - - - .11  Agents maximize expected utility: 
Pr(healthy) ( ) Pr(sick) ,  and
Pr(healthy) ( ) .
i i i i i i
i i i i
EU x m x pe m x pe
EU x m x pe
a t t
a t
= + - - - + - - -é ù é ùë û ë û
= + - - -
 
More specifically, we assume that the probability of being healthy for untreated 
agents is determined by an exogenous parameter , [0, ]i i nq qÎ Î¥ ,12 which represents 
the severity of the infection. At 0, the agent is healthy; at n he is the sickest in the 
population, which has size n + 1. We assume that the sicker a person is, the less likely he 
is to recover without treatment. Therefore, the probability is a function of ?: pr(no 
recovery) = p(?), with p'(?) > 0, and pr(recovery) =  1 – p(?).  In particular, to calculate 
explicit results, we will assume that pr(no recovery) = q2/n2 and pr(recovery) =1 – (q2/n2). 
We will also assume that, in each period of time, the probability that a particular 
individual is assigned a certain iq  is independent of the iq  of the previous period, so that 
neither the government nor the agents can use past sickness as a predictor.13 This 
formulation therefore implies that the level of resistance each individual faces at any 
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point in time is the same and independent from each person’s medical history. This is 
consistent with the fact that resistance spreads easily from one bacterium to another 
(Levy, 1992). Therefore, we can write 
2 2 2
2 2 2
( , ) 1 ( ) 0 ( ) ( )i i i i i i iEU m x m x x x m x
n n n
q q q
q a t a a tæ ö= - + + - - = - + - -ç ÷
è ø
. (1) 
If agents receive treatment for their infection, their expected utility is no longer a 
function of the severity of the infection. Recovery depends on whether the infecting 
mechanism is susceptible to the treatment: the higher the level of susceptibility, the 
higher the probability of recovery. We normalize the stock of susceptibility E to the      
[0, 2n-1] interval, and assume that the probability of recovering is 
ln(1 )
ln(2)
E
n
+
, and the 
probability of no recovery is 
ln(1 )
1
ln(2)
E
n
+
- . If the treatment is effective, once again 
( )i i iU x m x pa t= + - - - . If the treatment does not work, utility from x once again 
equals zero. Therefore, 
ln(1 ) ln(1 )
( , ) ( ) 1 0 ,
ln(2) ln(2)
i i i i iE EEU m x m x p m x p
n n
q a t t
é ù+ +
= + - - - + - + - - -é ù é ùê úë û ë û
ë û
 
and  (2) 
 
The agents’ maximization then consists of a discrete choice problem: 
 
 
 
 
if 
2
2
ln(1 )
( ) ( ) ( ) 1
ln(2)
i i i iE x p x x e
n n
q
a a a
+
- ³ - Þ = , and 
ln(1 )
( , ) ( ) .
ln(2)
i i i iEEU m x m x p
n
q a t
+
= + - - -
2 2 2
2 2 2
ln(1 )
( , , 1) ( ) ,
ln(2)
versus
( , 0) 1 ( ) 0 ( ) ( ) ,
i i i i i
i i i i i i i i
E
EU m e x m x p
n
EU m e x m x x x m x
n n n
q a t
q q q
q a a a t
+
= = + - - -
æ ö
= = - + + - = - + - -ç ÷è ø
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if 
2
2
ln(1 )
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
ln(2)
i i i iE x p x x e
n n
q
a a a
+
- < - Þ = . 
Therefore, for agents with a serious infection, for whom pr(sickness) = (q2/n) ® 1, 
treatment will be worthwhile even if the efficacy of the treatment is low. More 
specifically, for the sickest individual in the population, for whom pr(sickness) = 1, it will 
always be worthwhile to undergo treatment as long as 
ln(1 )
( )
ln(2)
iE x p
n
a
+
> :14 
ln(1 )
( , , 1) ( ) ( , , 0)
ln(2)
i i i i i i iEEU m n e x m x p EU m n e m x
n
a t t
+
= = + - - - > = = - - . 
In a world of decentralized choices, the marginal individual is the one for whom 
2
2
ln(1 )
( ) ( ) ( ),  that is,
ln(2)
ln(1 )
1 .
( ) ln(2)
i i iI
I i
E
x p x x
n n
p E
n
x n
q
a a a
q
a
+
- = -
+
= + -
 
In this simple formulation, we are ignoring the fact that, at least in Western coun-
tries, antibiotics are not available over the counter, and a doctor must prescribe the 
medicine. One simple way to accommodate this would be to introduce a floor on the level 
of iq  below which doctors will not treat the patient, iDq . Given the evidence of antibiotic 
over-prescription discussed in the introduction, however, it is reasonable to assume that 
in practice this constraint does not bind: i iD Iq q> . 
The stock of susceptibility to antibiotics or pesticides used until time t, denoted by E, is 
such that its behavior through time can be described by the following equation of motion:  
 (3) 
 
where ?  is the marginal impact of individual usage on resistance development, and P is 
the amount spent in resistance management activities such as education on the risks of 
resistance. The preventive activity is financed by the lump sum taxes t  levied on each 
individual in the community, so that (n + 1)t  = P. In the medical literature, activities that 
1
0 ,
1
n
i
i
e
E
w
+
·
=
-
=
R +
å
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could be included in P range from ex ante prevention to ex post containment of the 
infection (Murray). They include education on the risks of resistance and on the 
appropriate use of the chemical; techniques through which the chemical is put to use, 
such as one-, three-, or ten-day antibiotic cycles (ex ante), and containment of the 
infection or of the resistant pest population (ex post). 
This specification follows Brown and Layton in that the effect of antibiotic usage 
on the stock of susceptibility is linear. We will discuss some of the consequences of a 
nonlinear specification later. This characterization of the problem’s dynamics indicates 
that the increase in resistance taking place in each period affects only the future 
effectiveness of the antibiotic. This lag is due to the fact that resistance takes some time 
to spread.  
In this formulation, if there is no usage of the chemical, resistance management is 
ineffective. The reason is that resistance management is not independent from utilization 
of the drug, which is essentially a way to minimize the impact of usage on the 
development of resistance. This will ensure that the stock of susceptibility E is effectively 
a nonrenewable resource and that, at each point in time, E is such that 0E E£ , where 0E  
is the initial stock of the resource. We are implicitly assuming that the level of preventive 
activity P is always as high as possible. The rationale for this is twofold. First, the effects 
of preventive activities are certain and immediate, and the benefits derived from a correct 
use of antibiotics are not limited to the slowing down of resistance but include better 
health for the individuals treated. Taking a course of antibiotics correctly improves a 
patient’s chances of recovery in addition to reducing resistance buildup. Secondly, P is in 
practice of limited effectiveness and cannot eliminate the development of resistance, so 
an analysis of its dynamics is of limited interest. 
Increases in the antibiotic price p, will decrease the number of people taking the 
medicine, because if 0 1p p> , 
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This is an expected result. It indicates that the magnitude of the change in p that 
would be needed to bring down overuse depends on 0
( )i
p
xa
, the real price of the medicine 
in utility terms. If income is large compared to the cost of the antibiotic, as is typically 
the case in Western countries, very large increases in price will be needed to substantially 
decrease overuse.  
In a decentralized world, there is overuse of the antibiotic, but usage decreases with 
time as efficacy decreases. The socially optimal marginal individual is the one for whom 
2
2
ln(1 )
( ) ( ) ( ),  that is,
ln(2) 1
ln(1 )
1 .
( ) ln(2) ( )( 1)
i i iS
S i i
E
x p x x
n n
p E
n
x n x
w q
a m a a
w
q m
a a
+
- - = -
R +
+
= + - +
R +
 
And it is evident that  
ln(1 )
1
( ) ln(2)S I i
p E
n
x n
q q
a
+
> = + - . 
This is similar to Brown and Layton’s characterization. The difference between the 
social optimum and the decentralized case is given by the shadow value of susceptibility 
times the individual effective impact of usage on resistance, 
( 1)
w
R +
, weighted by the 
utility of consuming good x, ( )ixa . The higher the utility derived from the consumption 
0 0
1 1
0 1 0 1
1
ln(1 )
1 and
( ) ln(2)
ln(1 )
1 ,  so
( ) ln(2)
ln(1 ) ln(1 )
1 1 0.
( ) ln(2) ( ) ln(2)
I i
I i
I i i
p E
n
x n
p E
n
x n
p E p E
n n
x n x n
q
a
q
a
q q
a a
+
= + -
+
= + -
+ +
- = + - - + - >
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of good x which might be foregone if the agent is sick, the closer ?S is to ?I, because the 
benefits of using the antibiotic in the present (the costs of delaying usage) are higher. As 
for the decrease in usage in the decentralized case,  
1
21 ln(1 )
1 0
2 ln(2)(1 ) ( ) ln(2)
I
i
p E
E E x n
q
a
-
D æ ö+
= - + - <ç ÷D + è ø
. 
First Scenario:  No Substitutes for the Antibiotic 
We start by discussing the simplest case. In this scenario, there are no alternatives to 
the antibiotic, and resistance management is the only activity that can slow down the 
mining of susceptibility. This is not necessarily a realistic scenario, because it assumes 
that no technological change is possible, but it is useful in setting the stage for the 
problem. The social planner seeks to maximize15 
1
0 10
Max (untreated) (treated)  
i
n
i i rt
e i i i
EU EU e
g
g
¥ +
-
" = = +
é ù
+ê ú
ë û
å åò , 
s.t. 
( )
1
n
E
w g- -
=
R +
g
. 
Assuming that n is large, so that the proportion of population not taking the drug, ?/n, 
can be treated as a continuous variable, and remembering that  
2
1
1
( 1)(2 1)
6
K
i
i K K K
=
= + +å , 
we can reformulate the problem as 
1
0 1
Max (untreated) (treated)
n
i i
i in
EU EU
g
g
g
+
= = +
+å å . 
We can rearrange the maximand as follows: 
( )2 1
2
0 1
ln 1
1 ( ) ( )
ln(2)
n
i i i i
i i
E
x m x x m x p
n n
g
g
q
a t a t
+
= = +
+é ùé ùæ ö- + - - + + - - - =ê úê úç ÷
è øë û ë û
å å  
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In this problem the presence of a positive discount rate for the future, r, is a debat-
able assumption. As Ramsey wrote, the discounting of future generations is “ethically 
indefensible and [originating] merely from the weakness of the imagination” (Ramsey, p. 
543). We can view this as a general formulation of the problem that allows for the 
particular case of r = 0.16  The present-value Hamiltonian is then 
( )
2
ln 1( 1)(2 1)
( 1) ( ) ( 1)( ) ( )
6 ln(2)
( )
.
1
i rtEH n n m x p n e
n n
n
g g g
g a a g a g
w g
m
-é + ù+ += + - + - + + - - - - Rê ú
ë û
-
-
R +
 
We rewrite the Hamiltonian in terms of the proportion of people treated: 
 
. 
 
We can simplify this to 
  
 
 
( )
2
ln 1( 1)(2 1)
( 1) ( ) ( 1)( ) ( ) .
6 ln(2)
iE n n m x p n
n n
g g g
g a a g a g
++ +
+ - + - + + - - - - R
( )
2
ln 1( 1)(2 1)
( 1) ( ) ( 1)( ) ( ) ( 1)
6 ln(2)
iE n n m x p n n
n n
g g g
g a a g a g t
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The first-order conditions are 
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PROPOSITION 1. The proportion of untreated people increases over time if the  
discount rate is positive. 
Proof. We take the derivative of (6) with respect to time, and equate it to (7): 
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This result implies that, if the discount rate is zero, the optimal policy is to have a 
constant percentage of the population receiving treatment through time. The level of 
social welfare will, however, decrease over time as the efficacy of the antimicrobial 
declines. If, on the other hand, r > 0, then 0
n
g
·
æ ö ³ç ÷
è ø
, as the term in brackets is positive. 
Note the result that 0 for 0rg
·
= =  is independent from the specification of the 
dynamics of resistance but depends on resistance development being linear. We could see 
resistance buildup as exponential, because resistance in bacteria is transferred not only 
via reproduction but also through gene exchange. Therefore, “One [surviving bacterium] 
can produce new copies of itself, as well as recruit new resistant neighbors” (Levy 1992, 
p. 78), and resistance spreads faster as more people are treated. If the erosion of 
susceptibility is specified as 
( )exp
1
n
E
w g-é ùë û= -
R +
g
, individual use has increasingly high 
costs in terms of resistance. In this case, the optimal policy would be to increase the 
proportion of untreated people through time, even if the discount rate is zero. Therefore, 
the conclusion that, when the discount rate is zero, the optimal policy is to have a 
constant percentage of the population receiving treatment is a conservative one. 
 
Second Scenario:  The Existence of Certain Exhaustible Substitutes 
In this case, we will assume that there exists an alternative technology to the original 
antibiotic. Specifically, it is possible to develop another antibiotic that is superior 
technologically to the existing one because it mines susceptibility more slowly than the 
original one. That is, the new chemical has a lower impact on resistance: 1 2w w> , where 
1w  is the impact of the old technology on resistance and 2w  is the impact of the new one. 
The development of this substitute is certain but it requires investment in a capital stock. 
The structure of this model is similar to that of the second model developed by Vousden 
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in the case of oil. We have three control variables: 
n
g
; the proportion of people treated 
with the new chemical, 
n
d
; and the level of investment, I. Two state variables are E and 
the capital stock K. Investment increases capital, so that ( )K f I
·
= , and f ' > 0, f '' < 0, 
and investment presents increasing marginal costs because of the nature of the research 
and development process, so the cost of investment, g(I), is such that g' > 0, g'' > 0. 
Because of the quasilinearity of the utility functions, the formulation is the same whether 
we assume that agents treated with the newer antibiotics still pay the same price p and the 
government finances the difference or whether agents pay the full price for the newer 
treatment. Initially, the costs of using a new drug are very high: clinical trials require 
expensive Food and Drug Administration approvals and are conducted by highly trained 
medical personnel. In addition to that, the production of new drugs itself is often very 
costly. As more resources are invested in the research of the new drug, costs decline. 
Therefore, we model the cost of the new antibiotic as an increasing function of the 
number of people treated with it, d, and a decreasing function of the level of capital K:  
c(d, K), such that c1(d, K) > 0, c2(d, K) < 0, c11(d, K) > 0, c22(d, K) > 0, c12(d, K) < 0 for d 
and K > 0, c (d, 0) = c2(d, 0) = 8 , and c (0, K) = c1(0, K) = c11(0, K) = 0. Note that there is 
no capital depreciation, so the nonnegativity constraint for capital is always satisfied. For 
simplicity, we will assume that K0 = 0. The social planner problem is then 
( )
3 2
, , 0
1 1
 1
3 2 6
ln 1
Max   1
ln(2)
( 1)( ) , ( )
rt
I
n n
i
n
n
n n n n n
E
e dt
n
n m x p n n c n K g I
n n
g d
g g g g
a a
g
a
g d
¥
-
ì üé ùé ùæ ö æ ö æ ö æ ö+ - + +ï ïê úê úç ÷ ç ÷ ç ÷ ç ÷
è ø è ø è ø è øï ïê úë û
ï ïê ú+ï ïæ öê ú+ -í ýç ÷ê úè øï ïê úï ïæ ö æ öê ú+ + - - - - R - -ï ïç ÷ ç ÷ê úè ø è øï ïê úë ûî þ
ò , 
Optimal Antibiotic Usage with Resistance and Endogenous Technological Change / 17 
s.t. 
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The Hamiltonian is 
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The first-order conditions are 
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Note that (10) is the same condition as in the first scenario (no technological change) 
as long as 1w w=  (see equation [5]).  
If 1 21 , + 01
rtnc n K e n
n
w wd
m-
-æ ö- =ç ÷ R +è ø
, then 1
1 2
1
, rtc n K e
n
d
m
w w
-R + æ ö= ç ÷- è ø
. 
PROPOSITION 2. The dynamic path of the proportion of untreated people is the same 
as in the first scenario if the impact of the existing antibiotic on resistance is the same 
( 1w w= ). This is due to the fact that the optimal policy is independent from the 
distribution of wealth.  
Proof. We take the derivative of (10) with respect to time, and equate it to (11): 
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PROPOSITION 3. Investment declines over time if the discount rate is zero. If the 
discount rate is positive, the time path of investment will depend on the importance that 
the stock of capital has on the reduction in the cost of producing the new drug. 
Proof. Investment will not start as long as '(0) '(0)rtg e fu- > . Once 
'( ) - '( ) 0rtg I e f Iu- = , 
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If 2
'( )
( , )
'( )
g I
c K r
f I
d > , investment will decline over time. In this case, because the 
benefits of investment are certain, the level of investment will be initially high, so that its 
benefits can be captured as soon as possible, and then taper off.  
The start of investment will not, in general, coincide with the beginning of use of the 
new technology. The date at which sufficient capital has been accumulated to make use 
of the new technology economically viable will depend on the structure of the cost 
function c. Specifically, treatment with the new technology will be delayed as long as 
1 2
1 1
rtc e
w w
m
-
>
R +
. If, for low levels of capital stock, the marginal cost of treating even 
very few patients is high, adoption of the technology will be deferred. Figure 1 suggests a 
possible cost structure. For levels of capital below K0, the cost of treatment is prohibi-
tively high.  
PROPOSITION 4. The time path of the proportion of agents treated with the new 
antibiotic depends on the net effect of a capital increase in the cost of administering the 
new drug and the impact of the use of the new drug on resistance. 
Proof. We rearrange (13) and take its derivative with respect to time, and equate it 
to (11): 
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FIGURE 1. A possible structure of the cost function for the new technology 
 
The long-run behavior of the percentage of population treated with the new technol-
ogy will depend on the difference between the reduction in costs brought about by a 
capital increase and the net effect of the use of the new drug on resistance buildup. Figure 
2 shows a possible path for the portion of people treated with the old and new chemical, 
with a positive interest rate, and ( / ) 0nd >&  globally. In this case, since the number of 
untreated people keeps increasing, as does the number of people treated with the second 
antibiotic, the slope of the latter must be flatter, or d g
· ·
< . If, on the other hand, the 
discount rate for the future were zero, the number of untreated people would be constant 
but the number of people treated with the new antibiotic might still increase through time, 
albeit more slowly (see [18]). 
 
Third Scenario: Uncertain Nonrenewable Substitutes 
In this scenario, the discovery of a backstop technology is not certain, and the probabil-
ity of developing a new (nonrenewable) technology is endogenous, depending positively on 
the cumulative amount of R&D effort. We suppose that the new technology is a real break-
through, so that it renders the stock of susceptibility remaining at the time of the discovery  
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FIGURE 2. Treatment with a positive discount rate in the second scenario 
 
worthless. A good example would be the discovery of “biospecific antibodies,” which 
recognize harmful bacteria and take them to the human cells that can eliminate them 
(Nemecek). Define T as the time at which the new technology becomes available, and W 
as the maximum social welfare possible after the new technology is  
( )
1
max  
n
i r t T
iT
W U e dt
¥
- -
=
æ ö= ç ÷
è ø
åò . (19) 
As we said above, the probability of discovering a backstop technology is endoge-
nous, and depends positively on the cumulative amount of R&D effort. Define the level 
of R&D in each time period as I, and the cumulative level of R&D, or stock of 
knowledge capital, as K. We will assume that the dynamic relationship between stock and 
flow of knowledge has the same structure as in the previous scenario: 
( )K g I
·
= , (20) 
s.t.     (0) 0,  (0) 0, ' 0,  and " 0.K f f f= = > <  
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We define the probability of discovering the backstop as ( )Kf . Expression ( )Kf  is 
such that (0) 0f = , '(0) 0f = , ' 0f ³ , and lim ( ) 1
z
zf
®¥
= . This is the same structure of the 
R&D function specified in Kamien and Schwartz (1978). The probability of discovering 
the new technology in the interval dt equals  
( ( )) '( ( )) ( ) '( ( )) ( )d K t K t K t dt K t f I dtf f f
·
= = . 
In their seminal 1974 paper, Dasgupta and Heal prove that if WE = 0, as we have 
assumed here, a certain kind of certainty equivalence results, so that the maximization 
can be rewritten as 
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The optimal control problem has two control variables: g/n and I, and two state 
variables, E and K. In general terms, utilization of the antibiotic shall cease in finite time 
at, say, T* because the susceptibility that makes it effective is nonrenewable. The 
presence of uncertainty might modify the optimal T*, but, because the discovery of a 
backstop in the period [0, T*] cannot be guaranteed, it might be the case that the 
susceptibility of the antibiotic is exhausted before an alternative technology is invented. 
We define the social welfare function before the introduction of the backstop as 
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The first-order conditions are  
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PROPOSITION 5. The proportion of untreated people increases through time.  
Proof. We take the derivative of (26) with respect to time, and equate it to (25): 
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Note that the first term is identical to the expression on the right-hand side of equa-
tions (8) and (16) in the certainty cases. In this case, however, if r = 0, then ( / ) 0ng >& , 
because we can rewrite (27) as  
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, 
and m , the shadow value of susceptibility, is positive. The presence of uncertainty 
modifies a result that held for both the certainty cases. Because the date of discovery of 
an alternative technology is now unpredictable, the use of the existing technology is more 
prudent.  
PROPOSITION 6. The level of investment increases through time. The increase is 
higher if the discount rate is positive. 
Proof. We take the derivative of (23) with respect to time, and equate it to (24): 
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Conclusions 
The model’s results on the use of existing antibiotics are, in general, extremely 
robust to changes in the specification of the nature of the research. They suggest that, no 
matter what the nature of the alternative technology to invest in, the optimal policy would 
limit the number of people treated with the existing antibiotic. In practice, however, it 
appears that the number of people treated with the existing antibiotics is on the increase, 
at least in Western countries. This is particularly worrisome in the context of the results 
of the last scenario, which suggest that if the nature of the discovery process is uncertain, 
the number of people treated should be restricted through time, even in the more 
intergenerationally equitable case of a zero discount rate for the future.  
The model also indicates that if the research process is certain, short bursts of high-
level investment might be optimal, while resources invested in R&D should increase 
through time if the discovery process is uncertain.  
According to the American Society for Microbiology, in the mid 1990s, the short- 
and medium-term prospects of availability of new drugs were not very good. More 
recently, the report of the July 1997 workshop of the Forum on Emerging Infections, 
created by a joint initiative of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and 
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the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), states that “Also, 
because general confidence in the existing antibiotic toolkit had muted any sense of 
urgency, there has been a distinct lag in producing new classes of antimicrobials, despite 
great advances in the fundamental science that is fueling pharmaceutical innovation in 
many other areas. This situation is changing, and the pharmaceutical industry has in the 
past few years expanded its investment substantially, but public-sector investment awaits 
reinvigoration. What is needed now is sustained, sufficient support—for basic pioneering 
research, for the clinical research required to move truly new products from the 
laboratory to the pharmacy, and for the infrastructure underpinning both” (Harrison and 
Lederberg). This quote suggests that research might be underfunded; both the level of 
investment and its time path appear to be suboptimal. 
Linked to the issue of funding is the question of investment choice. We have been 
implicitly assuming that science determines in each instance the specific nature of 
investment to which research efforts should be directed. The social planner is presented 
with only one type of investment possibility and can choose only the (continuous) 
amount of resource to devote to it. However, if various choices of investment were 
possible concurrently, the model could still be utilized to determine the optimal 
combination of investments. 
  
 
 
 
Endnotes 
1. Another instance of the importance of resistance is the case of agricultural pesticides. According to the 
National Audubon Society, in 1993, 504 insect species were known to be resistant to at least one 
formulation of pesticide, while 150 fungi and other plant pathogens had developed resistance to 
fungicides (Cate and Tinkle). As for weeds, 212 herbicide resistant weed biotypes were reported to be 
in existence in 1998 (Heap). 
2. We will use the terms drug, antimicrobial, and antibiotic interchangeably. 
3. In agriculture, there exists a corresponding problem. Because of the mobility of the pest population and 
the common property nature of susceptibility, farmers may exhibit myopic behavior toward the future 
development of resistance, which results in overapplication of the pesticide. In case of overutilization 
of the chemicals, be they antimicrobials or pesticides, the first step is to determine optimal usage to 
help devise policies that reduce suboptimal utilization.  
4. This occurs via mobile pieces of DNA, called plasmids or transposons, which move from one 
bacterium to another and become part of the new host’s genetic material.  
5. In the case of pesticides, the transmission of resistance occurs only via reproduction, so the time path 
of resistance development is easier to predict, and multipesticide resistance is not the norm. However, 
cross-resistance is a concern at the core of the policy debate today, as it is the rationale for the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) unprecedented policy of mandatory refuges for Bacillus 
thuringiensis (Bt) plant pesticides, genetically engineered to produce pesticides (EPA, 1998). 
6. In the pesticide field, novel pesticides, which combine lower toxicity for humans and alternative modes 
of actions, range from chemical modifiers of development and behavior (pheromones, growth 
regulators) to artificial analogues of natural elements, such as the chloronicotinyls (from nicotine) to 
insect-tolerant plants and genetically modified crops (Pedigo). 
7. See Gambardella for the pharmaceutical industry and Hammock and Soderlund for the pesticide 
industry. 
8. As for pests, there are various instances of lack of fitness costs; see, for instance, Andrews and 
Morrison; Croft and Whalon; Penrose; and Romero and Sutton.  
9. The pharmaceutical industry is also myopic in its behavior toward resistance, because E is a public 
good. 
10. This is a simplification in the case of patented drugs, but it reflects reality for older drugs. 
11. We will not concern ourselves with nonnegativity constraints for y.  
12. It would be possible to choose a more complex distribution that puts some mass at 1q . This would not 
change the quality of the results.  
13. Alternatively, we could interpret this as having a stationary population of size n with individuals living 
only one time period.  
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14. In the case of pesticides, this basic framework could be used to analyze the behavior of risk-neutral 
farmers who receive an endowment m in each time period and whose crops are produced by a 
composite input x via a concave production function a. The application of pesticides can be considered 
a discrete problem, either because the farmers follow the recommended dosage instructions or because 
they do not have a choice over the dosage, as in the case of the recently introduced Bt crops, which are 
genetically engineered to produce a pesticide. We indicate the level of infestation by ?; the stock of 
susceptibility as Eä[0, 2n-1]; the cost of the pesticide application as p; and the efficacy of the pesticide, 
a function of susceptibility, as 
ln(1 )
ln(2)
E
n
+
. Then the expected profits have the same form as the expected 
utilities specified above.  
15. Note that this maximization indicates the lack of credit markets for both the government and 
individual agents.  
16. Note that a negative discount rate could be advocated in this context because the future generations 
will necessarily be poorer than the present ones, as the stock of susceptibility at their disposal is lower. 
See Goodin for arguments against the use of discounting, particularly when human health is concerned.  
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